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Spatial Elements in Visual Awareness.
Challenges for an Intrinsic
“Geometry” of the Visible
Liliana Albertazzi
CIMeC (Center for Mind/Brain Sciences) and Department
of Humanities, University of Trento (Italy)
Résumé : Un enjeu majeur pour les recherches actuelles dans les sciences de la
vision consiste à mettre au point une approche dépendante de l’observateur –
une science des apparences visuelles située au-delà de leur véridicité. L’espace
dont nous faisons l’expérience subjective est en réalité hautement « illusoire »,
et les éléments de base du champ visuel sont des structures qualitatives, contex-
tuelles et relationnelles, et non des indices métriques et dépendants du stimu-
lus. Sur la base de nombreux résultats disponibles dans la littérature traitant
de la manière dont fonctionnent les divers constituants de l’espace (formes,
surfaces, etc.), l’article décrit les éléments qualitatifs de base d’un tel espace
et pose la question de la « géométrie » des apparences visuelles. Il formule
enfin un ensemble de propositions pour d’éventuelles recherches poursuivant
l’examen de l’espace visuel d’un point de vue expérimental.
Abstract: A challenge for current vision science is to develop an observer-
dependent science—a science of visual appearances beyond veridicalism. The
space that we subjectively experience in vision is, in fact, highly “illusory”,
and the primitives of the visual field are qualitative, contextual, and relational
patterns rather than metric or stimuli-dependent cues. Drawing on the exten-
sive evidence that the experimental literature on visual space perception offers
on the behavior of the various constituents of that space such as shapes and
surfaces, the paper describes the qualitative primitives of such a space and
addresses the question of the intrinsic “geometry” of visual appearances. The
paper also makes suggestions for potential future developments of examining
visual space from an experimental viewpoint.
Philosophia Scientiæ, 19(3), 2015, 95–125.
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1 Introduction
The visual objects in conventional psychophysical science are mainly under-
stood and represented in terms of Euclidean geometry, starting from primitives
defined in terms of points, lines, and surfaces. It is generally assumed that
there are Euclidean surfaces in the visual field, and that shapes have geometri-
cal properties replicable in computational terms [Marr 1982]. This is generally
seen to be an unproblematic issue in the current computational theory of vi-
sion. However, doubts about the Euclidean nature of visual spaces and visual
objects have been raised by a broad array of so-called geometric illusions:
straight lines are seen as curved [Hering 1861], [Zöllner 1860] or slightly tilted
[Morgan & Moulden 1986], [Münsterberg 1897], arcs are perceived as flattened
[Müller-Lyer 1889], [Tolanski 1964], vertical segments are overestimated with
regard to horizontal ones [Chapanis & Mankin 1967], [Oppel 1854-1855], cir-
cles and squares are perceived with apparent size [Ebbinghaus 1902], [Coren
& Enns 1993], as are areas [Wundt 1898], lines are perceived with appar-
ent rather than actual length [Diaz & Delay 1990, 1992], [Müller-Lyer 1889],
[Ponzo 1912], cubes, prisms, cones and conical shells undergo perspectival re-
versal [Benussi 1925], [Derȩgowski 2014], [Kopfermann 1930], [Necker 1832],
[Thiéry 1895], the contours of triangles are vividly present in the total ab-
sence of any stimulus indicating such lines [Kanizsa 1979], arrays of triangles
can spontaneously “point” as a group in a selected direction [Attneave 1968],
[Palmer & Bucher 1982], objects appear in such a manner as to seem physi-
cally “impossible” [Penrose & Penrose 1958], while objects which are impossi-
ble from a geometric viewpoint are perceived as physically plausible [Huffman
1971], [Kulpa 1987], and geometrically complete drawn parallelograms appear
to be phenomenally incomplete because of 3-D interpretation of the orien-
tation of the drawing with respect to the picture plane [Massironi & Bruno
1997]. Apparently, Wonderland is not merely a space of literary imagination!
To put it in more explicit terms, the space we see in is intrinsically imagi-
native (Goethe spoke in terms of an exact sensory imagination). The main
qualitative “skeletal” [Metzger 1941] characteristics of this space are convex-
ities (the space outside) and concavities (the space inside) [Massironi 1998],
and between these two characteristics, there may be an entire phenomenology
of spatial variations. Perkins & Cooper, when testing the “errors” committed
by subjects in the perception of surfaces inclinations, described the human
perceiver as a “sloppy geometer” [Perkins & Cooper 1980]. However, this is
an unfair characterization, because what the subject perceives is something
intrinsically qualitative and should not be compared to a Euclidean metric
viewpoint or indeed even more complex spaces defined by Cayley/Klein ge-
ometries [Koenderink, Albertazzi et al. 2010]. The qualitatively different per-
ception among the observers implies that the spatial percepts of the general
population may well be highly variable between observers. In other words, dif-
ferent individuals see in (partially) different ways; however, the differences are
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identifiable [Foley 1965]. These results gainsay the assumption of psychophys-
ical and neurophysiological research based on the concept of an ideal observer.
Seeing is a process where space, more than being a static sequence of planes,
is bodily situated in a frame of basic egocentric directions—such as right/left,
above/below, in front of/behind—with a biological normative aspect (above
is “better” than below, in front is “better” than behind, etc.).
Examples of the “odd” behavior of shapes abound in the experimental lit-
erature on space perception [Gregory 2009], [Shapiro & Todorovic in press],
[Wackermann 2010], as to so-called pictorial space illusions, see [Dunning
1991]. Those experiments make manifest the role of the perceiver in shap-
ing appearances in visual awareness, so that the boundary between what is
usually supposed to be real and what is a product of imagination is very la-
bile. Perhaps the most insightful explanation of what occurs in seeing is still
the Aristotelian idea of phantasia, i.e., the mind’s organization of qualities in
subjective space and time [Aristotle 1986]. What occurs in seeing, in fact, is
a question more of a psychic organization of qualitative contents in a multidi-
mensional simultaneity than of a set of relations and operations following the
rules of formal geometry. A good example of how shapes behave in awareness
is Michotte’s parallelepiped, an anamorphic line drawing of a parallelepiped
on a sheet of paper which is viewed with one eye at a high slant [Albertazzi
2011], [Massironi & Savardi 1991], [Michotte 1948], [Vishwanath 2014]. What
is seen is a truncated pyramid with a transparent strongly voluminous appear-
ance. Michotte observed that the visual effect of solidity (the plastic effect)
was just like stereopsis in that the wire frame object appears to stick out of the
paper and to be so real as to be graspable. To be noted is that this 3D effect
takes place in the continuity of seeing, which suggests that 3D must be an eco-
logically dominant feature. Another extraordinary effect is the “Corrugated
Mondrian” effect, where different patches of grey (of identical stimuli) appear
to be of different colors because of the (again, “illusory”) perceived light in
the phenomenal space [Adelson 1993].
The visual field in seeing appears as a twofold extendedness [Extensität]
(the term in [Brentano 1995]) filled with qualities at a certain location, where
also the voluminous appearance of shapes is perceived more or less as such,
more or less remote from the perceiver him/herself.1 From the observer’s
viewpoint, in fact, depth is also subjective [Koenderink 2013], [Koenderink, van
Doorn et al. 2011], [Vishwanath 2010]. For all these reasons, the phenomenal
space of awareness has important similarities with pictorial space: one may
perhaps say that they are different degrees of reality of appearances [Mausfeld
2013], [Metzger 1941].
A major source of surprise is the discovery that we are not the only liv-
ing beings that perceive “illusions”. So-called geometrical illusions such as the
1. The German term Extensität is translated with extendedness because it refers
to the qualitative nature of perceptual space: it does not refer to the classical math-
ematical concept of extension [Ausdehnung].
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Ponzo, the Müller-Lyer and the horizontal-vertical illusion, seem to be per-
ceived by species as diverse as apes (chimpanzees [Fujita 1997]), monkeys, e.g.,
[Barbet & Fagot 2002], [Bayne & Davis 1983], [Suganuma, Filgueiras Pessoa
et al. 2007], [Tudusciuc & Nieder 2010], see also [Fujita 1996], ungulates,
e.g., horses, [Timney & Keil 1996], birds (domestic chickens, [Winslow 1933],
[Nakamura, Watanabe et al. 2014], [Rosa Salva, Rugani et al. 2013]), ring doves
[Warden & Baar 1929], pigeons [Fujita, Blough et al. 1991, 1993], [Nakamura,
Fujita et al. 2006], [Nakamura, Watanabe et al. 2008, 2009], grey parrots
[Pepperberg, Vicinay et al. 2008], and fish [Sovrano, Albertazzi et al. 2015].
The evidence of similar perceptual scaffoldings in species so different suggests
either the presence of homologous traits inherited from a common ancestor, or
the rediscovery of analogous frames by otherwise very different species. The
space that we see in, besides being anisotropic, is essentially a space for the
action of “invisible” forces and vectors [Leyton 1999], where the visual shapes
change according to the configuration, the context, and the temporal exten-
sion in which they momentarily appear or remain visible. The δ movement
[Kenkel 1913], [Harrower 1930] is an excellent example of what occurs in the
unfolding of the acts of presentation. The phenomenon is visible when, in the
tachistoscopic exposure of a cardboard disc for ca 100 ms, there is an expand-
ing movement of the internal part of the figure, i.e., one sees an appearance
that unfolds together with a distortion of the margins even in brief processes.
The δ movement is also a phenomenal expression of the arousal and disap-
pearance of visual forms, for example when we light up a dark room and the
objects seem to expand. The same happens with lines [Eagleman & Sejnowski
2007], [Fröhlich 1923], [Harrower 1930], [Hubbard 2014], at least in the case of
European subjects.
Spatial appearances are also cross-modally perceived by the general pop-
ulation (i.e., men and women of different expertise, and non-synaethetes) as
naturally associated with color, sound, taste, touch and olfaction.
Experimental data show that circles are associated with red, triangles with
yellow, acute angles with the range of red-yellow, and obtuse angles with the
range of blue-green [Albertazzi, Da Pos et al. 2012]. This holds also for bi-
ological shapes, in which the pattern “round” and “elongated” appear to be
matched respectively by reddish colors and bluish colors [Albertazzi, Malfatti
et al. 2015]. These collections of data raise the issue of a “geometry” of the
purely visible, i.e., of the formal representation and modeling of what a subject
perceives in actual seeing, where s/he is directly presented with appearances,
not with physical objects. The expression “pure visibility [Sichtbarkeit]” is
reminiscent of Reid’s idea of space [Reid 2000], but more specifically refers to
Fiedler’s theory of pure visibility [Fiedler 1991] and the idea that the mind pro-
duces the building block materials of appearances. I do not endorse Fiedler’s
separation between vision and the other senses, apart from touch, but I largely
agree with his view of what seeing is (see also [Hildebrand 1893]). More than
being illusory, the space of vision requires primitives and laws of organization
different from the physical ones. The primitives of a geometry of the visible,
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in fact, more often than not are imbued with connotative dimensions making
them meaningful for the perceiver.
In considering the main characteristics of a geometry of visual space, one
has to be aware of a twofold possible approach: one addresses the genesis of
visual shape (dynamically unfolding in the microgenesis of a presentation); the
other addresses the appearances as such and their primitives.
In light of the foregoing considerations, I shall proceed as follows in this
paper. I shall briefly list some issues concerning what can be viewed as a sort
of radical change of perspective in vision science [Albertazzi 2013a], thereby
dealing with the issue of the primitives of visual space. In other words, I shall
conduct the pars destruens of a viewpoint well established in vision science.
Hopefully, this will promote the development of a pars construens of a “ge-
ometry” of visual space, which necessarily requires collaborative work among
experimental phenomenologists, philosophers, and mathematicians. Given the
exploratory nature of the present inquiry, it is necessarily merely descriptive
in Brentano’s terms [Brentano 1995]. However, suggestions are given as to po-
tential future developments of the framework from an experimental viewpoint
(see for example [Albertazzi, Canal et al. 2015b]).
2 Appearances and physical objects
The rationale underlying the reversal of viewpoint proposed above is well ex-
emplified by the contraposition of the Galilean and Humean points of view
on the question of whether qualities (the matter of appearances) can or can-
not be objects of scientific inquiry [Albertazzi 2013b]. As well known, qualities
are classically distinguished between primary or physical properties (spatiality,
solidity, hardness, weight, shape, size, position, motion), and secondary ones
(colors, tastes, smells, sounds), the latter classically thought to be a product of
British empiricism. However, it was Theofrastus already in the third Century
BC, who pointed out that in perception
[...] one could develop these inquiries better [...] so as to show
what qualities are proper to the sentient subject. [Theofrastus
1976, vi 2 1]
Galileo’s opinion on the point was very clear:
[...] I think that tastes, odors, colors, and so on are no more
than mere names so far as the object in which we place them is
concerned, and that they reside only in consciousness. [Galilei
1623, 274]
A correct statement indeed! Visual appearances (also in dreams) are given
in perceptual awareness, have a qualitative nature and, strictly speaking, are
psychic facts, i.e., they pertain to consciousness. However, as Hume remarked:
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It is universally allowed by modern enquirers, that all the sensible
qualities of objects, such as hard, soft, hot, cold, white, black,
&c. are merely secondary, and exist not in the objects themselves,
but are perceptions of the mind, without any external archetype
or model, which they represent. If this be allowed, with regard
to secondary qualities, it must also follow, with regard to the
supposed primary qualities of extension and solidity; nor can the
latter be any more entitled to that denomination than the former.
The idea of extension is entirely acquired from the senses of sight
and feeling; and if all the qualities, perceived by the senses, be in
the mind, not in the object, the same conclusion must reach the
idea of extension, which is wholly dependent on the sensible ideas
or the ideas of secondary qualities. [Hume 1975, 154]
The difference between physical and phenomenal objects has been shown
since the first Gestalt studies. In current science, however, it is widely believed
that Gestalt descriptions function mainly as heuristic cues for the presence of
physical objects. This conception is broadly endorsed today by most scientists
of perception when they assume that phenomenology describes (in first person
accounts), while psychophysical and/or neurophysiological research, whose ob-
servables are metric quantities, explains (in third person accounts) [Albertazzi
2013a], [Spillmann 2009].
What is entirely missing in a Galilean framework, however, is a place for
meaning (a sort of Faustian “stone guest” in current science) and value [Köhler
1939]. Current vision science is mainly syntax oriented. For example, in
vision, algorithmic processes are applied to optical data, i.e., what happens is
essentially the transformation of (meaningless) structures into (meaningless)
structures [Koenderink 2013]. But a giraffe is not simply an aggregate of
similar patches of black and white on a surface!
Meaningful appearances are incontrovertible primary ecological facts for
humans and non-human living beings, i.e., they are met [Kanizsa 1979, 1991],
[Metzger 1941, 2009]. To cite Goethe, one should not look for anything behind
phenomena, because phenomena themselves are the explanation. Certainly,
evolution has changed the external phenomenal world [Umwelten] [Uexküll
1934], [Koenderink 2012] by consolidating certain expectations, so that per-
ceived qualities include anticipatory components necessary for the behavior
and survival of living beings [Rosen 1991, 2012]. However, there are no pre-
established, guaranteed-to-be-successful templates (understood as computa-
tional file formats) for every possible experience. What we have developed (or
inherited) are schemes for actions like those offered primarily by the expres-
sive configurations and affordances that we encounter in the environment and
provide us with immediate information on how to behave [Gibson 1979]. One
of these templates, for example, is the capacity to see multiplicity in unity, a
“template for thinking”, to use Bohm’s expression [Bohm 1994]. To remain in
the field of color perception, a particularly striking case concerns the so-called
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semantic dimensions of color. Belonging to the perceptive dimensions of color
are qualities such as serious, mighty, serene, melancholic, already described in
Goethe’s triangle [Goethe 1982] (though in fact first developed by Schreiber),
but also qualities such as touchy-feely [Chirimuuta 2011], dull [Hering 1920],
shrill [Kandinsky 1911], etc.; and there is evidence that any of bright-dark
qualities is not unrelated to a scaling of light-heavy relationships, and these
lead easily to soft-hard comparisons. Likewise, warm-cool relates to wet-dry
dimensions [Albers 1963, 59]. There seems to be nothing more intermodal and
interdisciplinary than the semantic dimensions of color, which are of concern
to color science and color theory, art and design, and psychology. Two well-
known cases in this field are the difference between cold and warm colors, that
can be considered as one of the basic invariants of perceived color [Da Pos &
Green-Armytage 2007], [Da Pos & Valenti 2007], [Ou, Luo et al. 2004], [Xin,
Cheng et al. 2004], and the difference between light and heavy colors [Arnheim
1954], [Itten 1961]. Neither of these differences derives from either physical
properties of radiation or physiological processes, and classical colorimetry has
nothing to say in this regard [Boynton 1979], [Brainard 1995], [Koenderink &
van Doorn 2003]. For example, the basic polarity of the semantic attributes
of color, warm-cold, is not represented in colorimetry space.
3 Qualities
Qualities need to be reconsidered in light of a thorough taxonomy of qualities,
which is currently lacking. The best analyses are still those by Metzger and
Rausch [Metzger 1941], [Rausch 1966] (see also [Albertazzi 2010], [Pont 2013]).
Prima facie one distinguishes among qualities of the skeletal structure (such as
shape, movement, change, stability and instability); qualities of material (such
as phenomena of brightness, transparency, hardness/softness); and tertiary
qualities (the ways of being of qualities, in Metzger’s terms) such as expressive
and physiognomic qualities (friendly, aggressive, masculine, appealing) and
affordances [Gibson 1979]. The difficulty of composing a proper taxonomy
of qualities, however, is caused by their very nature, because qualities are
intrinsically relational. Some examples will help.
There is a figure/ground organization allowing whatever appearance to be
visible, and the rules governing the emergence of a figure on a ground fol-
low a precise hierarchy of conditions [Rubin 1949], [Peterson & Gibson 1993].
Visual qualities are always in the eye of the beholder, and they are given and
reported in first person account, i.e., in subjective judgments based on visual
awareness; qualities always appear in a mereological relation of whole (aware-
ness) and parts (configurations of qualities as appearances); the configurations
of qualities always have different degrees of Prägnanz [Koffka 1935], i.e., they
follow an order of appropriateness; qualities are intrinsically cross-modal (for
example, we perceive bright, thick, matt tunes). There are also qualities of
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qualities, such as the coloratura in music, or the ϕ movement (the objectless
movement consisting in a perception of motion to which does not correspond a
concomitant perception of objects in motion) and the β movement (when two
fixed lights are lit with an inter-stimulus interval of ca 50 msec, only one light
is seen in motion from left to right (see [Wertheimer 1912]). Psychophysical
methods and measurements do not apply here; whence derives the difficulty
of designing methods to test qualities. Qualities are also given in a series of
polarities (such as small/large, high/slow, sweet/sour, coarse/fine), and of spa-
tial directions (left/right, below/above, in front of/behind). Issues therefore
arise as to whether, for example, when perceiving something hot, one perceives
cold as its amodal background; whether certain basic couples of qualities exist
in all the modality domains, such as the hot/cold pair; or whether there are
overlapping couples with the same semantic space, such as hot/cold, dry/wet,
and sweet/sour. These are not idle questions, because answering them may
induce us to reconsider the Aristotelian idea of a science of the sensible qual-
ities based on couples of contraries such as hot and cold, and dry and wet
[Aristotle 1906, 420a 25-420b], [Theofrastus 1976, ivi, on Democritus, 442b
11], [Aristotle 1980, 8001a, 10 ff.], [Aristotle 1986, 420a25-420b], [Theofrastus
1976, on Democritus, vi, 1, 6]. This notion engenders a very different concep-
tion of the human perception of the environment, and of nature, which in our
awareness appears to be intrinsically and naturally multimodal, qualitative,
and scaled: for example, physically there is no object which is “more or less
long” or “more or less short”.
4 Aisthesis
If one analyses vision as a whole of appearances, it is difficult to maintain
a sharp distinction between what pertains to science and what to aesthetics;
or to be more precise, among perceptual, pictorial, and mental spaces, all of
which are highly imaginative [Albertazzi 2006a,b]. In current science, subjec-
tive appearances are translated into third person account and re-presented in
mathematical models, through metrics which tear off their qualitative char-
acter. This is one of the reasons why artistic products have hitherto often
furnished the best re-presentations of appearances, much more than metrical
and computational models. The writings of Alberti, Da Vinci, von Hildebrand,
De Chirico, Marinetti, Klee, Kandinsky, et al., and also handbooks on how to
draw [Ruskin 1857], or to paint [Hogarth 2002], are real sources of visual the-
ory, showing what points, lines, surfaces and volumes are from a perceptual
viewpoint; i.e., what the primitives of spatial appearances in visual awareness
are. Observations relevant for the study of spatial primitives are to be found
on the aesthetics of space [Lipps 1897], the already mentioned nature of the
pure visible or appearance [Sichtbarkeit, sichtbare Erscheinung], (see [Fiedler
1991]), the difference between close and distant images [Hildebrand 1893], ab-
stract shapes (animal and inorganic as well) [Riegl 1966], the relation between
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abstraction and empathy [Worringer 1908], and the perception of shape orga-
nization (lines to planes, to shapes, etc.) [Wölfflin 1950], [Kandinsky 1926].
Art is in fact an instrument with which to generate knowledge about nat-
ural processes, rendering manifest the conditions to make appearances visible:
consider, for example, drawing, painting, and sculpting techniques, or proce-
dures to generate metallic luster in ceramics. The visual analyses, specifically
developed by artists straddling two centuries (the eighteenth and the nine-
teenth) are major explorations of the phenomenology of vision. Potentially,
they could help to rewrite entire bodies of literature in vision studies: consider,
for example, studies on shape from shading, where the concept of the shading
cue may be replaced by that of the cue for relief articulation [Koenderink, van
Doorn et al. 2015].
Currently some of these issues are being examined by both experimental
aesthetics and cross-modality studies, which are undergoing a rapid scientific
development. However, in such research the (ontological) dichotomy between
so-called objective features and subjective aspects of experience still domi-
nates, and the methodologies adopted are usually those of psychophysics. As
varied as they may be, what these studies analyse are usually very simple
stimuli: say, a grapheme and a color, a color and a sound, a smell and an ol-
faction (for a review see [Spence 2011]). What we cross-modally and generally
perceive in the environment, however, are high-level, cross-modal, interlocked,
and most of all meaningful, configurations of qualities [Albertazzi, Canal et al.
2015a]. What is missing in many contemporary studies is analysis of the char-
acteristic of pure visibility, i.e., the purely qualitative aspect of visual objects,
and the specific nature of the spatial extension of visual objects, of which
artists, instead, have always been aware [Albertazzi 2011]. The study of art-
works thus becomes a “laboratory” for the analysis of the laws of seeing and
visual appearances [Metzger 2009, chap. 12, 2]. Indeed, the artist does nothing
but test, exemplify and reshape the construction of appearances based on laws
that are also active in the natural perception of objects. This point of view has
also been expressed to some extent by, among others, Da Vinci see [da Vinci
& McCurdy 2002], Klee [Klee 1961] and Kandinsky [Kandinsky 1926].
5 Spatial primitives
Our visual field, in the case of shapes, appears to be partitioned into spatial
entities that can be described in terms of seen points (or punctoids), seen lines
(or lineoids), seen surfaces (or surfaceoids), and seen volumes (or volumoids).2
2. The coined new terms punctoids, lineoids, etc. refer to how the visual points, the
visual lines, etc., qualitatively appear in the visual field. The use of such terminology
should avoid the danger to take these patterns as Platonic ideas or abstract concepts,
which would be the case if one adopted terms such as “pointness”, “liness”, etc.
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What are these perceptual entities? Are they geometric entities? Are
they coextensive with what we cognitively ascribe to the physical world?
Alternatively, are they dependent on how our mind generates and external-
izes these entities—i.e., psycho-geometric entities? What are the conditions
of their appearance, their linkages and interdependencies? Are they meaning-
bearers, and if so how? As mentioned, the arts are a rich field of research
into these issues whose results should be further tested from an experimental
phenomenological viewpoint.
It is necessary for experimental phenomenology [Albertazzi 2013a],
[Vishwanath 2013]:
To start with the perceptual phenomena and strictly avoid mix-
ing up perceptual phenomena with their physical or physiological
causes or to derive from the latter any principle of classification.
[Hering 1920, 24]
The main tenets of experimental phenomenology pose problems of method,
units of measurement, metrics (if any), and a formal theory of the spatial
appearances [Kubovy 1999].
In order to identify the nature of the visual primitives, for example, one has
to consider them in the space in which they appear, a space embedded with
forces, raising, lowering, pushing appearances in different directions, and at
different perceived velocities (see the concept of teleiosis in [Brentano 1988]).
Embedded in this space are the laws of growth of form appearances [Thompson
1961], [Goethe 1978], [Haeckel 1904], [Ostwald 1922]. Consider a subjective
visual square: in perceiving certain configurations as “squared”, we perceive
not a Euclidean figure but a specific quality (i.e., “squaroid”) that covers a
variable but always small number of variations. “Squaroid” has the charac-
ter of a zone of particularly pronounced potential transformations which is
merely perceptual. A visual square is also “sitting” on one of its sides, and
therefore perceived as stable. When rotated by 45 degrees [Chen & Freeman
1984], [Schumann 1900], notwithstanding any change in its metrical size and
dimensions, the square presents a different appearance: that of a diamond,
which is certainly more similar to a rhombus than to a square, and in un-
stable equilibrium. Visual squares can appear differently in tachistoscopic
presentation [Sander 1926], void [Bressan 1985], [Woodhouse & Taylor 1987],
textured so as to have an inky, spongy, metallic, etc. quality; of different size
if filled with lines [Helmholtz 1867], [Mather, O’Halloran et al. 1991], and
endowed with connotative dimensions (good/bad, pleasant/unpleasant, ap-
pealing/disgusting) [Köhler 1939]. One can measure how square forms differ
from Euclidean squares. In so doing, one sees that the kind of units used for
its measurement are not the JND of psychophysics, because one is measuring
qualitative dimensions as parts of perceived space [Albertazzi 2012]. Testing
the nature of a square appearance means relying on subjective judgments in
first-person account. There is no other way to proceed, because what has to
be tested and measured is how a square appearance appears to subjects, in the
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space of mental visual awareness. What is needed is a geometry of visual forms
based on subjective qualities as perceived by humans, and in some respects
also by “other species of mind” [Allen & Bekoff 1997]. More than imposing a
metrics, one must rely on degrees of (qualitative) similarity as perceived by
subjects, and on what is the order of appropriateness for that specific type of
shape (for example, the best clue of the category squaroid). The complexity
of the judgment of similarity and order is immediately evident when one con-
sider that, depending on dimension, color, texture, etc., from time to time, in
different contexts, one shape can be perceived as more square than another.
The first step in proceeding towards a geometry of the purely visual is to
develop a taxonomy of primitives’ appearances which is as complete as possi-
ble, something similar to what Katz did for colors and their ways of appearing
[Katz 1935]: for example, classifying the properties, the modes of appearances
and the conditions for a figure to look like a square, and the extent to which
it does so. It is necessary to abandon the idea that spatial primitives are
stimuli re-presentations and in fact a product of information recovery and sen-
sory completion: i.e., estimating properties of “objective” quantitative reality
and having a direct access to its statistics captured in the mathematics of
Bayesian estimation [Albertazzi, van Tonder et al. 2010], [Koenderink 2010,
2012], [Hoffman 2013], [Lappin, Norman et al. 2011], [Vishwanath 2005].
6 Visual points, lines, surfaces and
volumes
The questions to start with in order to frame a “geometry” of visual space
are the following: What are the visual spatial primitives? e.g., what is a vi-
sual point as to the “what” and the “where”? What are the relations among
visual primitives, their visual extendedness, and space? What are their prop-
erties? (dimensionality, modality/amodality, direction, color, etc.). What are
the conditions of their phenomenal appearance? (E.g., when is a visual point
visible? when does a visual point become a visual linelet, a disc, a volume?)
How can one classify, measure and model the subjective appearance of vi-
sual primitives? (E.g., in the way in which one does so with the subjective
experience of colors.)
Visual spatial primitives include seen points, seen lines, and seen surfaces.
What we perceive in the environment, in fact, are not Euclidean dimensions,
but fine threads, smooth wooden tables, water surfaces, gelatins, fogs: we do
not perceive points with neither dimensions nor color, or one-dimensional lines.
It is usually assumed that in 3D perception the customary order of perceived
objects is from points to lines to surfaces and volumes. However, we perceive
the depth, solidity and graspability of visual objects also in monocular vision,
i.e., in the visual field, where lower-order primitives are usually seen as bound-
aries of higher-order elements (i.e., surfaces are boundaries of volumes, lines of
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surfaces, and points of lines). I shall distinguish different forms of dependence
of lower-order elements on higher-order ones, so that the independence of the
individual primitives as such is to be viewed as the limiting case of dependence.
Dimensionality is one of the characteristics of spatial appearances, but
dimensions cannot be understood in the physical sense. Take the case of
visual points (punctoids). These are not zero-dimensional, but may be one- or
bi-dimensional (consider a hyper-compressed line reduced to its minimum, or
imperceptibly circular or even oval). Do visual points have internal structure,
i.e., parts? Can they be viewed as Euclidean points? Do they have borders of
various types (knurled or frayed)? Very rarely do they have perfectly circular
borders. When does a point in a 3D space (a star in the sky) become a sphere?
When does a point becomes a dash line? Do points have orientation? If so, at
what dimension? Do color and texture influence their appearance? Do points
change spatial attitude (depth, meeting of lines, position) in configurations?
Are there expressive points?
Consider a visual line (lineoid). It is one-dimensional, but has a marginal
second dimension: to be phenomenally visible, in fact, it has to possess a cer-
tain width. Does the presentation of a line in a 3D space or contextually with
other lines change its appearances? Do lines have visual location, direction,
weight (think of chiaroscuro), depth, density (are there free lines)?
Consider a visual surface (surfaceoid): bidimensionality is a limit case
(such as an A4 sheet of paper). However the bidimensionality of a fronto-
parallel surface changes if seen at 90 degrees and becomes a visual line, the line
being its non-detachable boundary. Do lines have visual location, direction,
weight, depth, density (are there free surfaces)?
Consider a visual volume (volumoid). Is “being voluminous” also perceived
in monocular vision? Is it necessarily related to grasping (motor action)?
Do visual volumes have location, direction, weight, depth, density (think of
clouds or fog)?
Another important consideration is that dimensions in presentation may
not be homogeneous, because visual space itself, besides being finite, is qual-
itative and non-homogeneous [Mach 1984, chap. 6–10]. Visual primitives
are also rarely detachable one from another: for example, how can one
detach the visual surface boundary of a volume, such as the red quality spread
on the surface of an apple? or the striated rose-yellow of a voluminous ap-
pearance of clouds?
Because pictorial space is a bidimensional space, it is a good “laboratory”
for the analysis and the explanation of the forms in visual space and their
genesis, i.e., of the conditions that allow them to be visible. When we draw or
paint on a canvas, what we are in fact doing is represent, i.e., objectivize, the
laws governing visual seeing. Artists are true to nature [Ruskin 1857], because
from a point of view of pure visibility nature itself is an indefinite potential of
morphological figurations localized in a space of pulling forces.
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7 Experimental phenomenology of a
visual point
There is lack of wide-ranging experimental evidence, based on subjective judg-
ments on the perception of points, lines and surfaces, on which to build a
theory of the primitives of visual awareness. Experimental evidence on the
presence or absence of parts in visual points, for example, would be essential
information on which to construct a theory of these and other visual spatial
primitives. A point can be a marked part of some higher-order object, such as
the origin of a line; or it can be unmarked, like an undifferentiated part of a
line, or of a crystal clear blue sky without discontinuities of any sort, as in the
Ganzfeld [Metzger 1930]. A point is also a position in space signalled by the
arrangement or the structure of other objects, such as the target of an arrow.
Here I shall consider seen points (punctoids) and their two main modes of
appearance: a point as an independent object (an object so small that it can
be seen even when it does not have phenomenally significant dimensions); and
a point as a dependent object. In both cases, the phenomenal visual points
have a form (contrarily to [Koffka 1935, chap. 4]).
It is difficult to define a point in phenomenal space as an independent ob-
ject. In fact, points may be independent from any higher-order object, but not
from the ground, which influences their appearance (a black point on a white
ground and a white point of the same size on a black ground look different);
points require color, and specific dimension to be visually distinguished and
distinguishable in the field in which they appear.
A point as an independent object may be defined as having a minimal ex-
tension, with tolerance; as being localized; and as having a qualitative width
and color (and color connotative characteristics as well, such as cold/warm,
and merry/sad); as having figural and border characteristics (thorny, hooked,
frayed margins as they appear in natural forms, such as stars or bacteria); and
as being expressive (appearing good or bad, according to their position on a
square frame, for example). Briefly, for a point to be a point there may be
an organization of size, texture, border, color, and orientation (relatively to
their borders, relatively to the planes on which they appear, such as right/left,
above/below, in front of/behind); and also expressive characteristics, such as
appearing stable or instable in space. Any model considering a point without
dimensions, would, under this conceptualization, be wrong. Once these char-
acteristics, have been carefully described, they must be tested experimentally
before proceeding to define punctoid as a primitive.
The second mode of appearance of a point is as a dependent object.
Consider the intersection point between lines, the extremes of a line, a point
induced by convergent segments separated by a spatial interval; or the tip
of an arrow, a cone, an edge, etc. Examples of dependent points in high-
level configurations are also Hermann’s grid (1870), Ehrenstein’s figures and
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phenomena of neon color spreading [van Tuijl & Leeuwenberg 1979]. Points
can lie on a ground, a line, a surface or inside or outside a volume: in a
cone, for example, a point on the vertex is seen as external, a point on the
surface is seen as external, while a point in the lower part is seen either on
the base surface of the cone, slightly raised because of transparency, or on
the inner surface of the cone. A point may amodally overlap with another
point or with a line (both externally or internally), and there may be coinci-
dence of boundaries of many overlapping points (consider the cone, above). In
stereokinetic cones (or ellipses) points also overlap in time, changing their lo-
calization either in surface or voluminous appearances. There may be amodal
points dependent on a texture of points, or induced ones dependent on four
converging segments. Points may have directions depending on their irreg-
ular borders or on their potentiality to move within the same higher-order
object on which they depend, without changing their type (i.e., being marked
or unmarked). There are different degrees of freedom of directions in points
as dependent objects. In fact, they can be marked points (the end point of
the arrow); imaginary points (the internal points in a line or arranged in loose
configurations); unmarked points (when the point is merely the “target” of the
arrow). Consider then the midpoint of a disc and its degree of freedom: its
centre has full potential movement (complete freedom of direction). However,
if one removes a quarter of the disc, then half of the disc, its centre has
fewer possible movements (50% degree of direction) (see the concept of plerosis
in [Brentano 1988]). Finally, the direction of points may have degrees of punc-
toid (i.e., of Prägnanz).
As to the color of points as independent objects, they have their own color,
although influenced by the ground on which they appear. The color of points
as dependent objects, on the other hand, depends on the objects on which they
depend, such as the color of the lines to which they belong, or it is influenced
by the surface on which they appear.
The question of what a point is—or in other words, what the meaning of
a point in the visual field is—can be answered only by attentive description of
the multifarious modes of its appearances, and by a series of experimental tests
based on subjective judgments in first-person account. The visual appearance,
location, and meaning of points in space, in fact, depends only on seeing. Only
when one has the whole visual grammar of a point is one entitled to look for
the definition of a visual point.
8 Experimental phenomenology of a
visual line
A line’s appearance is multifarious as well, and the initial questions are sim-
ilar. What is a line? When is a line visible? When does a line cease to
appear as a line? When does a line become a solid/transparent surface or
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a hole? Do lines have orientation? If so, at what dimension? Do color
and texture influence their appearance? Do lines change spatial attitude (cur-
vature, position of shape) in configurations? Are there expressive lines? “How”
and “when” do we see lines: for example straight ones or curved ones? [Lipps
1897], [Platt 1960].
Here I shall consider the nature of seen lines (i.e., lineoids) and their two
main modes of appearance: a line as an independent object (a unidimensional
thin line that can be seen even when it does not have phenomenally significant
dimensions), and a line seen as a dependent object.
It is difficult to think of a line in phenomenal space as a totally indepen-
dent object. In fact, visual lines may be independent from any higher-order
object; but like points, lines are not independent from the ground, which in-
fluences their appearance (a black line on a white ground and a white line
on a black ground look different); lines require some other difference in color,
and dimension, for example, to be visually distinguishable. A visual line is
an elongated object that must have some minimal thickness to be visible (for
example, threads, or a differently colored horizon of the sea), and a thick line
behaves differently from a thin line. A line can be perceived as such although
not drawn, as the continuous prolongation of two converging segments, or as
two crossing lines of two converging segments.
A line as an independent object may be defined as having a minimal exten-
sion, with tolerance: its end-points are marked and have no degree of possible
movement (whereas its internal points are not marked and have two degrees
of possible movement); it is localized and has a qualitative width; it has color
and connotative chromatic characteristics such as cold/warm, merry/sad; it
has figural characteristics such as parts, potentially overlapping, so that a line
is only a formal limit of a surface; it has border characteristics, such as thick,
curved, zigzagged, blurred margins; and here the phenomenology is wide, be-
cause of the existence of smooth margins of a zigzagged line or zigzagged
margins of a curved line, etc. Lines have expressive characteristics (appearing
good or bad, cold or warm, aggressive or calm, quick or slow), relatively to
their thickness, density, direction, degrees of freedom in a configuration. For
a line to be a visual object there must be an organization of size, texture, bor-
der, color, and orientation (also in their “skeletal” characteristics, for example
appearing stable or instable in space).
The second mode of appearance of a line is as a dependent object. In this
case, a line can be a marked (or unmarked) part of some higher-order object
(e.g., an undifferentiated part of a surface such as imaginary lines, lying as
non-marked on a surface, or its marked boundary). A line can be a position
in space signalled by a suitable arrangement of other objects (depending on
their distance, context and relative position).
A growing set of visual lines extends in a surface, and the differently pro-
nounced lines in the set are seen as parts of space (consider a row of trees seen
by a perceiver in motion), their density being given by the different regular
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or irregular directions that they have (to the right/to the left, toward/below,
toward/above, centripetal/centrifugal). In the visual context lines are bound-
aries of both external surfaces and an inner area. They can also be boundaries
of transparent volumes and depth cues as in chiaroscuro. Lines can have an
overlapping of boundaries and parts in higher-order objects, such as surfaces
and volumes: in the case of a ball, for example, the circular line that one
sees is not a boundary of surfaces but of volumes, and one has virtual lines
dependent on the position of the viewer (the same holds for an oval disc, or
for a small ball moving on a bigger one). The visual sides of a volumetric cone
are boundaries of the solid; the same holds for a stereokinetic cone, although
with a higher degree of Pregnänz of the appearance of the voluminous solid
shape and a temporal shifting [Albertazzi 2004].
As the boundary of a surface-object (figure), the non-independent line has
the color of the surface to which it belongs; unmarked internal lines have
the color of the surface as well. In the case of lines as boundaries in higher-
order objects with different colors, such as a few quadrants of a disc, one may
wonder what the color of the common boundary is, because the figure-ground
effect may not apply here: one might see two side-to-side boundaries, or one
boundary only, having the color of the visually more salient figure. Only
experiments can give an answer to these preliminary questions.
9 Experimental phenomenology of visual
surfaces and visual volumes
From the standpoint of seeing, surfaces and volumes appear to be strictly inter-
related primitives. When surfaces are perceived lying on the same plane, the
margin assumes a double function—as a contour enclosing both the surfaces—
and the stratification of the two surfaces goes in parallel with the function
of the dividing border. Color is a determinant of both surface stratification
and the plastic effect in space. If a colored surface overlaps with and partially
occludes another differently colored surface, the visual margin separating the
two belongs to the former and its contour, while the surface to the rear is
perceived amodally as continuing behind the former. If, on the contrary, the
two surfaces are perceived as lying on the same plane, the margin line where
the two abut assumes a double function. In other words, the stratification of
the two surfaces, due to color, goes in parallel with the function of the dividing
border [Da Pos & Albertazzi 2015].
In perceiving, at near distance, and in stereoscopic images we obtain both
a 3D shape and an egocentric scale. The difference between stereoscopic
and pictorial space resides in the fact that what we perceive in pictures is
a 3D structure (3D shape and space) but that structure is not scaled to
the ego-center [Vishwanath 2014]. When one has a perception of stereop-
sis (either through a stereoscope or a physical object), it is because things
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are scaled to the egocenter. Therefore one explanation for why, when one
looks at a picture with one eye through an aperture [Vishwanath & Hibbard
2013] or with a synopter [Koenderink, Wijntjes et al. 2013], pictures appear
as if they are “stereoscopic” is because there is some presentation of ego-
centric scale [Vishwanath & Hibbard 2013]. Vice versa, when we look into
the distance in real scenes, the perception of 3D space/shape again becomes
more “pictorial”. This can be explained on the basis of the fact that one
no longer has the presentation of egocentric scale beyond a certain distance,
because egocentric distance becomes very difficult to assess farther and farther
away [Vishwanath 2014].
Because color and light conditions, and chiaroscuro as well, influence the
appearance of distance, stratification, texture, transparency, pictorial relief,
they are the conditions for volumes to appear in the visual field. Surfaces
themselves are transparent boundaries of volume appearances, like a quality
spread all over them [Alberti 1972]. The depth quality and plastic effect of
the objects in a scene are also fundamental to our perceived quality of realness
[Mausfeld 2013], [Michotte 1948], [Vishwanath 2010]. Both paintings and nat-
ural scenes show how the realness of visual objects derives to a great extent
from appearances made of secondary qualities in extended visual space, such
as flat, round, volumetric, soft, luminous, remote, close, graspable, etc.; and
how the space of vision is essentially a space constructed by the observers.
10 Preliminary conclusions
It emerges from the foregoing discussion that qualitative primitives in visual
space awareness—such as punctoids, lineoids, surfaceoids and volumoids—lie
at the basis of the perceived visual configurations such as trees, plants, living
beings, landscapes, and art works. They have specific and general properties,
and can be individually analysed only as limit cases of independence. They
form a whole/part hierarchy, may have coincident boundaries, present degrees
of Prägnanz, and bear expressive characteristics. If the “elements” of a geome-
try of the visible are to be identified, they have the nature of psycho-geometric
primitives, i.e., qualitative patterns, non-detachable from seeing. A geometry
of the visible is the geometry of an act of visual presentation.
Complete identification of primitives like punctoids, lineoids, surfaceoids
and volumoids can be achieved only after thorough empirical testing of their
characteristics based on subjective judgments in first person account. Standard
mathematical geometry is inadequate to account for them, because the primi-
tives of visual space are not merely geometrical projections of retinal stimula-
tion. Indeed, most aspects of the space-time in which those primitives appear
are still far from being clearly understood, such as the dynamics of their mor-
phogenesis in presentation, and the kind of continuum to which they pertain
[Albertazzi 2002]. Other preliminary aspects that should be considered are
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the laws of organization and interrelation among the primitives: for example,
one may expand the classic Gestalt laws by introducing the law of meaning
[Pinna & Albertazzi 2010].
From a biological and ecological viewpoint, when the various shape con-
figurations in nature and their coming into being are considered, the rules
underlying the development of visual spatial primitives seem to apply also
to the organic world of nature: consider punctoids (pointed formation from
seeds to microorganism), lineoids (linear formation of crystals or of light-
ning), surfaceoids (connective biological tissue), and volumoids (of clouds,
dunes or water masses) as analyzed in Haeckel and Thompson [Haeckel 1904],
[Thompson 1961]. In a few recent experimentaI studies on organic shapes
[Dadam, Albertazzi et al. 2012], [Albertazzi, Canal et al. 2014], for exam-
ple, it has been shown that when the images of organic forms are grouped
on the basis of certain characteristics (such as shape, margin, texture, di-
mensionality), rounded forms are perceived as harmonic and dynamic, while
elongated forms are perceived to some extent as disharmonious and static.
Furthermore, it has been shown that these spatial patterns are naturally asso-
ciated with colors [Dadam, Albertazzi et al. 2012], and that round shapes are
naturally matched by reddish colours (in the orange-red interval of the Hue
Circle) and elongated shapes are matched by bluish colour (in the blue-green
interval of the Hue Circle). From these experiments one may conclude that
the perception of a “round” attribute is generally associated with “reddish”,
“harmonic”, “dynamic” and “warm”, while the perception of an “elongated”
attribute is associated with “greenish-bluish”, “disharmonious”, “static”, and
“cold”. Adopting a qualitative approach to visual shapes might then result in
extraordinary findings, ones such that it is possible to think in terms of a nat-
ural history of forms evolved from a few basic spatial primitives imbued with
meaning—the idea at the core of Goethe’s Ur-formen [Goethe 1978]. Visible
in the “book of nature”, in fact, is the tendency towards qualitative patterns
and the repetition of patterns showing the same principles at work in different
taxonomic realms: a challenge for a science of visual appearances and their
primitives, and for an intrinsic geometry of visual space.
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